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Banking sector integration in Europe reversed its momentum with the Financial Crisis, with 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) withdrawing to national borders, in a time where uncertainty over asset 
quality and sovereign risk became the new paradigm. The M&A literature mostly focuses on the typical 
factors determining M&A in the banking industry during economic upswings yet gives little attention to 
periods of crisis. Taking this into account, this paper intends to shed some light on the drivers of M&A in 
the Euro Area during this troubled period. Making use of a multinomial logit model, results show that 
acquisitions during the crisis were effectively curbed by widespread credit risk, in the form of non-
performing loans, and do not appear to have been spurred by supervision nor by regulation. M&A activity 
during this period is driven by performance and liquidity, being most intense for banks in countries under 
higher macroeconomic distress and exhibiting higher levels of idiosyncratic risk and poor loan quality. 
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“I think that with growth returning and with the huge amount of work that is being done in relation to non-
performing loans, we are going to see a number of mergers taking place within countries and across 
borders.” 
Danièle Nouy, Chair of the Supervisory Board of the European Central Bank, Dec. 2017 
1. Introduction 
Banking sector integration in Europe is hardly a reality, as highlighted by Cabral et al. (2002). 
Fostered by politicians (EU Commission, 2005) and supervisors (Nouy (2017a)) alike, M&A activity 
experienced a boost in the years following the creation of the European Monetary Union, yet it reversed its 
momentum with the Financial Crisis. Poor macroeconomic performance, financial distress and sinking 
profitability tainted the Euro Area (EA) and caused agents to withhold their investment decisions, such as 
potential acquisitions. Amid widespread risk and chaos, national authorities acted at both national and 
supranational levels (e.g.: Banking Union) to control the situation, impacting the real and financial sectors. 
However, M&A activity did not come to a full halt, even if it is at values hardly comparable to pre-
crisis years. This raises two questions: i) what are the factors causing investment decisions to be cancelled 
and ii) what has been driving M&A during the crisis period. The literature on the determinants of M&A in 
the European context provides many answers for periods of economic upswing, discussing the impact of 
macroeconomic and regulatory variables (e.g.: Buch and DeLong (2004), Pasiouras et al. (2011)) and bank-
specific determinants (e.g.: Beccalli et al. (2013)). Yet, it barely gives – if any – attention to downturns.   
The purpose of this paper is to provide answers to these questions at the EA level, covering the 
period of the financial and sovereign debt crises, by attempting to understand which factors reduced the 
likelihood of banks becoming acquirers and, on the other hand, those increasing the chances of banks being 
involved in M&A (both as acquirers and targets). By employing a multinomial logit model, used in the 
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literature to distinguish between banks, this paper provides tentative explanations to these questions, 
showing that i) widespread credit risk, in the form of non-performing loans (NPLs), curbed the decision to 
invest and ii) bank M&A was more intense in countries with unfavorable economic conditions, 
fundamentally driven by profitability, overall market liquidity and involving targets with higher credit risk. 
In the end, Ms. Nouy may be right if NPLs are tackled simultaneously across countries without imposing 
too much stringency, as banks in the EA manage to escape the current low-profitability environment.  
This study is structured as follows: section 2 reviews the literature on the determinants of M&A, 
taking on a forward-looking perspective; section 3 presents the methodology; section 4 describes the data; 
section 5 outlines overall and robustness checks results; section 6 concludes this study. 
2. Literature Review 
Bank M&A in Europe is undoubtedly small compared to other sectors, especially at cross-border 
level. While Berger et al. (2001) pointed out that efficiency barriers may provide an adequate, broad 
explanation to this fact, researchers have attempted to understand what are exactly these drivers at EU level.  
i) Outlook of the literature 
Studies covering the determinants of bank M&A in Europe are scarce, especially when compared 
to the abundant US-based studies. Despite the European focus of this paper, several US seminal papers are 
important references in the literature, such as the in vs. out-market M&A studies of Hannah and Rhoades 
(1987) and Moore (1996), as well as those of Wheelock and Wilson (2000) and Hannah and Piloff (2006), 
which attempt to discern between the characteristics that make banks acquirers or targets. European studies 
build upon the hypothesis, methodologies (e.g.: multinomial logit models) and results of these authors. 
 This said, Europe-based studies are extremely diverse, covering distinct countries/periods and 
focusing on different determinants and types of acquisitions. Attempting to understand macro drivers of 
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bank M&A, Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001) and Buch and DeLong (2004) examine target vs. acquirer 
characteristics for European countries within the OECD context. Focusing on bank-specific characteristics 
in domestic vs. cross-border deals, Lanine and Vander Vannet (2007) delve into acquisitions in Central and 
Eastern Europe, while Hernando et al. (2009) and Köhler (2009) look at the EU-25. More recently, 
Pasiouras et al. (2011) analyze both bank and country-wide factors determining M&A in the EU-15, while 
Beccalli et al. (2013) enlarge this scope to consider acquisitions by banks in 23 European countries. These 
are just some of the studies on the subject; a more comprehensive summary can be found in Appendix A.  
These papers share two characteristics: none goes beyond 2006, meaning M&A during the crisis 
remains unstudied, and all combine macro and micro determinants. M&A activity cannot be explained 
without considering both levels and, as seen further ahead, unexpected results arise from combining 
systematic and idiosyncratic factors, with important implications for this study. 
ii) Determinants of M&A  
This section examines, for each relevant determinant identified in the literature, the rationales on 
how these drive M&A and the conclusions of different studies. 
• Macro determinants 
 Economic performance. The decision to invest in M&A is highly influenced by the 
macroeconomy, but this relation is unclear for bank M&A, as argued by Buch and DeLong (2004). Intense 
M&A may happen in periods of economic distress due to restructuring, being fostered by supervisors to 
promote financial stability. This is pointed out by Hernando et al. (2009) and Köhler (2009), who find a 
negative relation between GDP growth and M&A. Koetter et al. (2005) distinguish between ‘normal’ vs. 
‘distressed’ M&A and find that financial distress increases the likelihood of becoming a target. Pasiouras 
et al. (2011) find the opposite result, nevertheless.  
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Albeit an appropriate measure of performance, GDP may not be enough to capture the effect of the 
cycle. Yet, the literature does not include a control for the cycle even though Beitel et al. (2013) recognize 
that different stages of the business cycle matter in determining M&A in banking and investment and 
profitability are seen to be pro-cyclical, as shown by Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009). 
 Regulation. With the 2004 EU merger law1, the harmonization of merger regulation deemed 
differences between countries irrelevant in determining M&A, as stated by Köhler (2009). Yet changes in 
bank regulation may impact domestic M&A by affecting banks’ efficiency, as Pasiouras et al. (2011) point 
out, and cross-border deals by constituting barriers to M&A, as noticed by Berger et al. (2001). Pasiouras 
et al. (2011) show that banks operating in countries with stricter capital/liquidity regulation are less prone 
to be involved in M&A, but this relation remains unclear, as Karolyi and Taboada (2015) find acquisition 
flows to involve acquirers from countries with stronger regulations than the targets (regulatory arbitrage). 
Other determinants. Among the myriad of factors employed in the literature, some common 
controls include market concentration measures and other macroeconomic variables (e.g.: Credit-to-GDP) 
as used by Köhler (2009) and Hernando et al. (2009), as well as market conditions (e.g.:  average return on 
equity/assets) as included by Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001), Pasiouras et al. (2011) and Caiazza et al. (2012). 
For instance, Pasiouras et al. (2011) find the impact of profitability on a bank’s decision to expand abroad 
to exhibit contrary signs according to whether it is an individual bank or average sector characteristic. This 
result is highly relevant for the current study given the strong link between NPLs and market conditions, as 
found by Louzis et al. (2011), while reinforcing the importance of controlling for the business cycle. 
                                                          
1 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), 
followed by the Commission  Regulation (EC) No 802/2004  of  7 April 2004 implementing the former regulation. 
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• Bank-specific determinants 
Size. Larger banks are more expensive to be acquired, posing higher integration costs, and can take 
on hostile takeovers easily; however, the purchase of larger banks may also entail higher market power and 
attractive economies of scale and scope for the acquirer, as shown by Berger et al. (1993). The results of 
Caiazza et al. (2012) and, for cross-border deals, those of Hernando et al. (2009) show that larger banks are 
more attractive. From the acquirers’ perspective, Hannah and Pilloff (2006) as well as Beccalli and Frantz 
(2013) find that larger banks dominate acquisitions. 
Performance. The ‘inefficient management’ hypothesis of Palepu (1986) states that potential 
efficiency gains from acquisition should increase as returns (i.e. on assets) decrease and cost inefficiency 
increases for the target, especially for in-market acquisitions. Moore (1996) and Wheelock and Wilson 
(2000) reject this hypothesis for the US. For Europe, higher profitability and better cost management are 
seen to decrease the likelihood of a bank becoming a target, as found by Köhler (2009) and Pasiouras et al. 
(2011), using accounting ratios, as well as by Beccalli and Frantz (2013), who estimate X-efficiency 
measures. However, acquirers are more often efficient banks, as shown by Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001). 
Growth. Hannah and Rhoades (1987) hypothesized that banks with high (asset) growth would be 
attractive for banks willing to expand in the market of the target. Hernando et al. (2009) and Beccalli and 
Frantz (2013) find an insignificant positive relation between growth and the likelihood of becoming a target. 
Contrary to these results are those of Moore (1996), who finds that low growth of targets can also be 
perceived as unexploited higher potential profit by acquirers (in the US). On the buyer side, the rationale 
for acquirers to have higher growth rates is based on historical evidence that banks quickly becoming large 
gain greater capacity to acquire others, as suggested and proven by Beccalli and Frantz (2013). 
Capital strength. Capital ratio optimization is paramount to satisfy the several stake-holders of a 
bank, which involves different conflicting goals for managers. According to Harper (2000), the 
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rationalization of capital usage is the main driver of financial M&A, yet the sign of capital strength is not 
clear. From the target side, lower capitalization may lure acquirers, as found by Beccalli and Frantz (2013), 
since: i) supervisors may encourage M&A to improve financial stability; ii) targets may be more efficiently 
managed if the capital ratio is perceived as an index of efficient management (better capital optimization); 
iii) high leverage maximizes return on investment while reducing the purchase price premium. Yet, higher 
target capitalization may be desired if: i) supervisors pressure less-capitalized banks to seek out capital 
abundant targets; ii) managers do not exploit banks’ full profit potential to extract high earnings, as shown 
by Lanine and Vander Vennet (2007). From the acquirer side, Pasiouras et al. (2011) and Beccalli and 
Frantz (2013) hypothesize and find a negative relation with capital: low capital may be associated with i) 
more efficiently managed banks and ii) higher supervisory pressure to merge so as to safeguard stability. 
Liquidity. Theoretically, some ambiguity exists regarding the impact of liquidity. While a bank 
may be targeted due to high liquidity, which is interesting for an acquirer, acquisitions may be triggered 
due to illiquidity and financial distress. Pasiouras et al. (2011) and Beccalli and Frantz (2013) find negative 
relationships for both targets and acquirers, albeit not always significant. 
Lending activity. Loans constitute 58% of Euro Area banking assets (ECB, 2017a). Loan 
concession and its characteristics are bound to influence investment decisions: higher loan activity may be 
associated to aggressive expansion strategies and higher risk-taking, attracting potential investors. For 
acquirers, higher specialization can increase post-deal integration costs, according to Beccalli and Frantz 
(2013). In this regard, Pasiouras et al. (2011) find no significant relation, while Moore (1996) and Beccalli 
and Frantz (2013) find evidence of such a negative impact.  
Loan quality also impacts cross-border banking activity, as seen by Emter et al. (2018), who accuse 
NPLs of originating the recent retrenchment in cross-border banking flows. Some country-specific studies 
pay some attention to loan quality. For Germany, Behr and Heid (2008) recognize the importance of banks’ 
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credit risk differences in M&A performance, while Koetter et al. (2005) find that higher loan loss 
provisioning of a bank, an ex-post measure of credit risk, increases the probability of distress and that of 
becoming a target. For Italy, Focarelli et al. (2002) find that targets are linked with higher ‘bad loan’ ratios2. 
However, NPLs in their current definition have not been considered as determinants in the literature so far. 
Again, it should be highlighted that M&A during a crisis may not be similar, nor necessarily its 
determinants, to that of periods of growth and financial stability. M&As during a crisis is often driven by 
restructuring to avoid contagion and acquisition decisions by banks may be distorted and delayed in periods 
of high uncertainty, as argued by Beltratti and Paladino (2012). Hence, it is interesting to investigate 
whether the typical characteristics of M&As remain determinant in defining banks’ investment decisions. 
3. Methodology 
Following the literature, a multinomial logistic regression is employed to understand the effects 
of macroeconomic, regulatory and bank-specific variables on bank M&A. First proposed by McFadden 
(1973), the model builds on existing logit and probit models used in the literature, with the advantage to 
distinguish between acquirers, targets and non-involved banks. In panel form, it can be written down as: 
                                                   𝑃(𝑌𝑡 = 𝑖|𝑋𝑡) =
𝑒𝛼+β´𝑋𝑡
1 + 𝑒𝛼+β´𝑋𝑡
 , 𝑖 = 0, 1, 2                                          (1) 
where 𝑃(𝑌𝑡 = 𝑖|𝑋𝑡) is the probability of occurrence of 𝑌𝑡 = 𝑖 for a given bank at time 𝑡, given the 
characteristics of  vector 𝑋𝑡 Three different scenarios are considered: 𝑖 = 1 stands for the event of a bank 
becoming an acquirer, 𝑖 = 2 if it is acquired and 𝑖 = 0 if it is not involved in M&A. The determinants in 
vector 𝑋𝑡 include bank-specific, macroeconomic, regulatory and market variables which, following the 
literature, are lagged one year, according to the following specification:  
                                                          
2 Defined as ‘loans to firms in liquidation or other bankruptcy proceedings plus loans to firms having defaulted on repayment 
installments for at least six months’. This definition is close to that of NPL (see Appendix B) yet not entirely similar. 
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𝛽′𝑋𝑡 = 𝜙´𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃´𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿´𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜇´𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1   (2) 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡, includes the bank-specific characteristics suggested from the literature, as 
surveyed in section 2.ii and for which a description can be found in Appendix B. Following Pasiouras et al. 
(2011) and Hernando et al. (2009), bank variables are defined in relation to the country average at time 𝑡, 
as standardization controls for yearly shifts in means bank ratios. These include the logarithm of total assets 
(Size), return on assets3 (Profitability), the operating expenses-to-assets ratio4 (Cost Inefficiency), the 
growth rate of total assets (Asset Growth), the equity-to-assets ratio (Capitalization), the ratio of cash and 
cash convertibles to total assets (Liquidity) and the loan-to-deposit ratio (Loan specialization). Moreover, 
it includes loan quality, as expressed by the ratio of non-performing loans to total assets (NPL). This last 
variable is an addition to the literature and can proxy for credit risk, in the line of Behr and Heid (2008).  
Higher NPLs put pressure on a bank's capacity to generate profits, implying higher provisions, 
funding costs and capital rationalization efforts, crowding out lending to the economy and increasing 
systemic risk and financial instability. As highlighted by Anastasiou et al. (2016), the expectations of 
economic agents may be affected by these conditions, aggravating these impacts: expectations on instability 
may lead quickly to illiquidity and, ultimately, to insolvency.  
Yet, financial distress may actually be a driver of M&A by pushing down the price of a bank and 
its assets so that it is below the perceived value to the investor, that will intend to grasp that profitable 
opportunity. Additionally, in such cases, an acquisition may even be fostered and facilitated by the 
supervisory authorities. As such, it is necessary to understand what is the impact of an idiosyncratic NPL 
                                                          
3 Some of the performance indicators employed in the literature face some caveats, especially given the period under study. As 
such, this paper employs the return on assets, which is preferred to return on equity given its sign stability even under crisis (e.g.: 
negative equity and losses will produce a positive return on equity). This practice follows that of Caiazza et al. (2012). 
4 The operating expenses-to-assets ratio is also preferred to the cost-to-income ratio, as it is less directly related to profitability, not 
affected by interest rate changes and can give a better picture of gains/efficiency deterioration, also following Caiazza et al. (2012) 
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ratio increase for a bank on the likelihood of becoming a target: does it make it more attractive to acquirers 
or does it signal too much uncertainty on its asset quality and future profitability perspectives?  
For acquirers, a higher NPL ratio may mean less availability of resources to invest due to pressure 
on profitability and capital, yet it may also translate an aggressive strategy, transposing the argument of 
Beccalli and Frantz (2013) on asset growth. As such, the current paper’s prediction of the impact on 
acquirers is, a priori, uncertain, requiring investigation.  
𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑡 is a set of macroeconomic variables for country of bank 𝑖 at time 𝑡 which includes GDP 
growth and also the unemployment rate, given the dependency of bank M&A on the cycle, as identified in 
section 2.ii. Given the crisis period under study, it is important to properly control for the state of the 
economy, namely for sovereign debt crisis. The addition of said controls should allow to disentangle the 
effects of the crisis (constraining fiscal policy and the real economy), imbedded in bank-level variables – 
e.g.: NPLs are extremely driven by the cycle, according to Nkusu (2011) and Klein (2013).  
Other aspects affected banks simultaneously across Europe or on a country-wide basis, reason for 
which a group of regulatory dummies is considered in the model. A novelty in the literature, 
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is a set of variables for the inception of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and for 
binding, country-wide regulatory changes on NPLs.  
The birth of the SSM and first comprehensive assessment (Asset Quality Review) in 2014 marks 
an effort in ensuring banks’ adequate capitalization and resilience to financial shocks. As stated by Mersch 
(2013), a new single, stricter regime of supervision and resolution was set in place, with Euro Area wide 
consequences on banks’ businesses which ramify throughout time and beyond the pool of banks under 
SSM supervision. Daluiso (2013) postulates that the lack of a single system, namely during the crisis period, 
might have discouraged cross-border activity, but Pasiouras et al. (2011) argue that stricter regulation is 
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bound to affect M&A. Hence, there is interest in understanding what has been the impact of the SSM on 
banks’ likelihood of being engaged in M&A. For this purpose, a binary variable is created for the inception 
of the SSM, taking the value 1 from 2014 onwards. 
The possibility of endogeneity between banking sector consolidation and NPLs cannot be 
discarded. The ESRB (2017) underlines the role of M&A in the resolution of high stocks of NPLs, which 
often involves bank restructuring. after the merger/purchase, the new entity should have a higher capacity 
to reduce ‘bad loans’, as found by Focarelli et al. (2002), reducing the disparities in NPL and capitalization 
ratios between more robust acquirers and weaker targets. The ‘new’ bank is in a better position to proceed 
to internal resolution, write-off and should be able to dispose of NPL portfolios at a lower purchase price 
discount than if the target bank was to perform that operation on its own before – and bid-ask spreads are 
quite considerable for asset sales of banks close to/in distress, as documented by Fell et al. (2017).  
To tackle the possible problem of endogeneity, vector 𝑋 already includes lagged variables, yet also 
exogenous regulatory actions on NPLs are also considered, which might have produced an impact on loan 
quality and therefore on M&A. EA countries have proactively undertaken uncoordinated prudential 
measures to tackle NPLs in the last years, as stated in ECB (2017a), and, to capture the impacts of said 
regulatory actions, an exogenous categorical variable ranging from 1 to 5 is built, increasing with higher 
number and stringency of binding NPL-related regulatory actions undertaken in the country where a bank 
is headquartered. This approach follows that of Pasiouras et al. (2011) and is preferred to several dummies, 
as the effect of an additional regulation adds more stringency on those already imposed. 
Finally, 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 includes a group of market variables proxying for market 
conditions. This set of variables for the country of each bank 𝑖 includes the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 
as used by Hernando et al. (2009) to control for banking sector concentration, as well as market profitability, 
liquidity, following Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001) and Pasiouras et al. (2011), and market loan quality (NPL) 
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ratios. The last market variable is an addition to the existing literature and is included since systemic 
increases in NPLs reflect generalized constraints on overall banks’ current (and future) financials, affecting 
lending, investment and confidence at country-level, which may channel into sovereign risk. Decreasing 
market profitability, liquidity and loan quality makes investors unsure of the economic value generated by 
future M&A, as defended by Nouy (2017b), so that uncertainty on overall, rather than individual, asset 
quality and business model sustainability dissuades potential acquirers from engaging in M&A. 
4. Data 
This project makes use of a broad database covering from 2005 to 2016, comprising 1588 EA 
banks. The period under study has not been yet covered by the literature, as argued previously; moreover, 
it post-dates the 2004 EU merger reform and thus is not affected by country-specific M&A regulatory 
changes. Going further in time would be impossible due to lack of data; moreover, observations coming 
from different regimes would be mixed, which is not advisable to do, according to Beltratti and Paladino 
(2013). The relevance of conducting this study at the EA level is justified by the fact that banks in the EA 
are subject to common monetary policy conditions, regulations and, from 2014 onwards, supervision.  
This database combines several types of data from different sources: financial panel data, M&A 
data, macroeconomic data and a newly built data set on regulatory changes across the EA. Following the 
literature, extracted data exhibits yearly frequency. 
Financial bank-level data is obtained from the market data platform of Standard and Poor’s (SNL). 
For the case of merged banks, pre-merger information is consolidated from the information of pre-merger 
entities. The extracted data serves as the basis to build the variables driving M&A. In this regard, it should 
be noted that the definition of NPL definitions varied across countries and was only harmonized recently, 
as recognized in the EU ‘Vienna’ Initiative (Sirtaine and Rosenberg (2012)), which constitutes a limitation 
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of any paper analyzing NPLs on a multi-country scale. Acknowledging this, the data collection exercise 
strived, however, to the best extent possible given the information reported by the banks, to include data for 
loans more than 90 days past-due, instead of the accounting concept of impaired loans. The availability of 
NPL data conditioned this collection exercise, which could eventually cover a wider number of banks. 
M&A data on 582 intra-EA deals between 2005 and 2016 is obtained from SNL, comprising 
transactions performed by subsidiaries and being limited to credit institutions as defined in the EU’s Second 
Banking Directive Data, excluding deals involving investment/insurance firms. Completed mergers are 
acquisitions in which the buyer is the new entity created and the seller is the entity dismissed. Transaction 
data is aggregated to obtain annual estimates of the total number and value of acquisitions of banks located 
in a given country, a summary for which can be found in Appendixes C.1 and C.2. Applying the previously 
mentioned criteria, transaction data is linked to the bank-level database so that each bank receives a value 
of 1 in a given year if involved as an acquirer in a given deal, a value of 2 if involved as a target and a value 
of 0 if non-involved. Several transactions cannot be included as the acquirer/target is not disclosed; in the 
end, sample banks are involved in 175 acquisitions and in 157 sales. Appendix C.3 shows the total number 
of acquirer, target and non-involved banks for each country per year. This number may not match exactly 
the number of observations since the panel data set is unbalanced, yet robustness checks are performed to 
guarantee that results are not biased by the different information content of each year/bank. 
Macroeconomic data is gathered from several sources: GDP growth from Eurostat, unemployment 
rate from the World Bank and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index from the ECB’s European Data 
Warehouse. Regulatory data for NPL-related regulatory changes is collected and based on ECB (2017b) 
and built as described in section 3. Regulations by year, type and binding status are presented by country in 
ECB (2017b). Appendix C.4 summarizes them. 
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A quick overview of the data can provide some insights on M&A for the EA in recent years. From 
Appendix C.2 it can be seen that M&A, which is mostly domestic5, fell drastically after the financial crisis 
and did not recover to pre-crisis levels, behaving in countermotion relative to the average EA NPL ratio. 
Based on Appendix C.5, which presents statistics for each variable by category of bank6, it is 
possible to find statistically significant differences across bank categories. Banks involved in M&A present 
lower equity-to-asset ratios, howbeit the average equity-to-assets of acquirers is higher than that of targets. 
Focusing on assets, acquirers exhibit the fastest growth while targets the slowest. Acquirer banks are the 
least liquid, while exhibiting the highest degree of loan specialization and capacity to cover any unforeseen 
fund requirements. Only differences in profitability/cost efficiency are not significant across categories. 
Macroeconomic conditions are, on average, worse for banks involved in M&A and better for 
targets than for acquirers, which are based on countries with lowest growth and highest unemployment. 
However, non-involved banks belong to countries subject to more regulatory actions; the average NPL 
ratio is indeed the lowest for that category, while the highest for targets. Moreover, banks involved in M&A, 
especially targets, are found to be located in more concentrated markets. 
Appendix C.6 exhibits the correlations between variables. Relevant correlations are found between 
market credit risk and macroeconomic variables, as expected from Klein (2013), and between bank and 
market profitability, liquidity and loan quality. However, variables are scaled to country averages in the 
model to avoid biases hence correlations between scaled bank variables and market controls fall very close 
to zero and become insignificant at a 5% significance level. 
                                                          
5 Only 31% (173) of the total number of deals are cross-border deals, corresponding to 25% of the aggregate deal value.  
6 Appendices D.3.iii, D.3.iv and D.4.i, D.4.ii explore this data in a more granular fashion, by splitting the sample intro groups. 
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5. Empirical results and robustness checks 
i) Base results 
The multinomial model is estimated via maximum likelihood for the two approaches. Table 1 
below provides the estimates for ?̂? and Β̂ in (1). The first two columns of the output do not report the typical 
odds ratios due to the existence of multiple categories7 but, instead, show log relative risk ratios.  
To facilitate model interpretation, the result is also shown in terms of relative risk ratios. This 
procedure is undertaken so that, for a given category 𝑖, the exponentiated coefficient 𝑒
𝛽𝑗
(𝑖)
 will correspond 
to the amount by which the relative risk ratio is multiplied when variable 𝑋𝑗 increases by 1 unit. To facilitate 
interpretation, 𝑒𝛽𝑗
(𝑖)
is adjusted by the dimension of each variable: 1 p.p. increase for all variables except 
Size, the SSM dummy and NPL regulation. Interpretation is made simpler this way: taking capitalization 
as an example, the relative risk ratio for acquirers is 0.9, which means that, all else constant, a 1 p.p. increase 
to the equity-to-assets ratio will increase the likelihood of a bank becoming an acquiror by 10%, relative to 
the baseline scenario of not being involved in M&A. This said, the focus of the analysis is mostly on the 
sign, rather than on the size of the coefficient. 
Among bank-specific characteristics, size exhibits a significantly positive effect for both acquirers 
and targets, as expected. Capitalization has a negative impact on the probability of a bank becoming 
involved in M&A, as found by Lanine and Vander Vennet (2007) and Pasiouras et al. (2011), giving 
evidence for the ‘efficient management’ hypothesis even in times of crisis. The impact of capitalization 
seems to be slightly greater for acquirers (-10%) than for targets (-5%). 
 
                                                          
7 Following McFadden (1973) and taking into account the notation in section 3, a certain coefficient 𝛽𝑗 ∈ Β, for an explanatory 
variable 𝑋𝑗 ∈ Xt, will not only measure the marginal impact in the log odds of a given category 𝑖 with respect to 𝑋𝑗  but will also 
include another component related to other categories (a probability-weighted average of 𝛽𝑗  of all other 𝑋𝑗  for category 𝑖). 
Intuitively, this means that a coefficient will not only consist of the specific contribution of a certain variable to the likelihood of a 
certain event (e.g.: becoming an acquirer) as it also depends on the probabilities of all other categories (e.g.: becoming a target). 
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Table 1: Multinomial logistic model results 
 Estimated model Relative-risk ratios (adjusted) 
 Acquirers Targets Acquirers Targets 
Size 
0.345*** 0.348*** 1.412*** 1.416*** 
[0.06] [0.055] [0.061] [0.057] 
Profitability 
22.356** -2.611 1.251** 0.974 
[10.934] [6.473] [0.116] [0.067] 
Cost efficiency 
3.377 3.146* 1.034 1.032* 
[2.489] [1.866] [0.025] [0.019] 
Asset growth 
0.428 -0.805 1.004 0.992 
[0.364] [0.757] [0.004] [0.008] 
Capitalization 
-10.567*** -5.901** 0.900*** 0.943** 
[3.087] [2.365] [0.031] [0.024] 
Liquidity 
-1.957* -0.848 0.981* 0.992 
[1.154] [1.006] [0.012] [0.010] 
Loan specialization 
-0.002** 0.000 1.000** 1.000 
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
NPL 
-1.043 3.397** 0.990 1.035** 
[2.434] [1.458] [0.025] [0.015] 
GDP growth 
-3.539 2.587 0.965 1.026 
[5.121] [3.220] [0.053] [0.033] 
Unemployment rate 
14.13*** 6.126** 1.152*** 1.063** 
[2.646] [2.534] [0.027] [0.026] 
SSM 
-0.615** -0.473** 0.541** 0.623** 
[0.243] [0.223] [0.275] [0.250] 
NPL regulation 
-0.130* 0.014 0.878* 1.014 
[0.074] [0.072] [0.077] [0.074] 
Market profitability 
26.000* -3.312 1.297* 0.967 
[14.201] [8.058] [0.153] [0.084] 
Market liquidity 
-0.261 4.713*** 0.997 1.048*** 
[2.405] [1.778] [0.024] [0.018] 
Market credit risk 
-4.588** 1.971 0.955** 1.020 
[2.353] [1.765] [0.024] [0.018] 
HHI 
-4.585* 3.198** 0.955* 1.032** 
[2.577] [1.497] [0.026] [0.015] 
Constant 
-6.29*** -6.988*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 
[0.542] [0.465] [0.719] [0.592] 
McFadden R2 9.74% 
Likelihood ratio-test  227.02 (34) *** 
Number of obs. 9872 
 
Robust st. dev. in brackets. *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level 
 
On performance, results are in line with the theory and are extremely strong: higher profitability 
drives banks to become acquirers, whilst higher cost inefficiency increases the likelihood of becoming a 
target, as found by Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001) and Beccalli and Frantz (2013).  
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Bank growth has no significant relation for targets, in line with the findings of Hernando et al. 
(2009). The ‘attractive growth’ hypothesis of Hannah and Rhoades (1987) seems to be significant for the 
US, whereas it is inconsistent for the EA: when macro variables are included, no evidence is found for the 
positive relation (suggested by Beccalli and Frantz (2013)) between asset growth and higher probability of 
becoming an acquirer.  
Liquidity has the expected negative impact on acquirers, as well as loan specialization, although 
both variables have faint and barely significant effects. This means that idiosyncratic differences in liquidity 
and in banks’ business models seem to have played a fairly small role in driving acquisitions in the EA, as 
found by Caiazza et al. (2012) before the crisis. No relevant effects are found for targets. 
The NPL ratio does not affect the decision to acquire in the base model, yet it has a significantly 
positive impact in increasing the likelihood of becoming a target. Controlling for macroeconomic factors 
and systemic risk, an increase in credit risk compared to the mean of the market can be attractive to investors 
if, for example, they expect to profit from buying a (possibly valuable) bank which is being sold at discount 
due to NPLs in the target’s balance sheet8.  
Looking at macroeconomic variables, albeit GDP growth is found to be irrelevant, which is 
common in the literature, the unemployment rate is not, exhibiting a positive impact on the likelihood of 
being engaged in M&A for both acquirers (+15%) and targets (+6%). This seems to suggest that economic 
distress played an important part in driving bank M&A. The scale of this impact is in line with the findings 
of Hernando et al. (2009).  
The SSM dummy has a negative relation with the probability of being engaged in M&A as an 
acquirer and as a target, compared to previous years. Although designed to achieve a common level playing 
                                                          
8 An alternative explanation may be that foreclosure on the underlying assets provides collateral ownership that is valuable for 
the investor, at a cheaper price, which is a strategy common to investment funds investing in distressed assets. 
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field, the additional stringency it has brought seems to have negatively impacted M&A, consubstantiating 
the argument of Pasiouras et al. (2011), who state that tougher supervision and requirements may curb the 
full exploitation of potential gains from M&A. The hypothesis of Deluiso (2013) seems not to be valid and, 
despite the recent improvement in macro/micro performance, the inception of the SSM seems not to have 
brought any substantial improvements to banking sector consolidation in the short-run. 
Changes in regulation affecting NPLs have not stimulated M&A: instead they weakly reduced 
the likelihood of banks becoming acquirers, while producing no effect for targets. As described in ECB 
(2017a), whilst these regulations provided guidance to banks to improve NPL management, at the same 
time they imposed more standards and tougher rules on provisioning, write-offs and financial recognition. 
This weak, fairly irrelevant effect may be caused by the fact that benefits from better NPL disposal may be 
counterbalanced by higher efforts to satisfy new regulations. Moreover, the absence of significance puts 
the question on whether these regulations were successful in tackling NPLs – if so, a significant relation 
would be expected since the level of M&A is seen to be driven by loan quality, which is not the case.  
Market conditions impact M&A decisively. Overall profitability favors expansion decisions, as 
found in the literature. Also, banks in more liquid markets are more attractive for acquirers (+4.8%). 
Furthermore, market concentration has a relevant impact in decreasing the likelihood of becoming an 
acquirer, in line with Pasiouras et al. (2011), whereas it increases that of becoming a target, which is intuitive 
since there is “less chance for survival” in more concentrated markets.  
While an individual increase of the NPL ratio augments the probability of acquisition, a wide-
spread credit risk is negatively linked with the probability of acquisition. The systemic dimension of this 
increase causes banks to suspend investment decisions, as the opacity of banks’ asset quality generates 
widespread uncertainty. Investors are not confident in assessing the risk-return trade-off in the presence of 
pervasive NPL increases, deterring further consolidation even if returns are foregone, as defended by Nouy 
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(2017a, 2017b). The heterogeneity of NPL levels across countries naturally contributes to the lack of cross-
border M&A, especially if this country-wide risk increase can channel into sovereign risk, adding even 
more risk and uncertainty to investment decisions taken by foreign banks. This seems to be the case given 
the findings of Erce (2015), who documents significant pass-through rates from bank risk into sovereign 
risk under specific macroeconomic conditions (e.g. crisis) and for countries with higher NPLs.  
Yet, the optimality of the decision to not invest needs to be questioned at the light of Altunbas and 
Ibañez (2004), who identify gains in performance the more diverse credit risk is between merging banks – 
cross-border M&A might entail profit opportunities currently curbed due to the existence of a too large 
‘ambiguity premium’, as suggested by Izhakian and Benninga (2011), attached to M&A investments. To 
reduce this premium, a simultaneous effort must be made by banks to reduce their NPL exposures. 
ii) Robustness tests 
One of the main concerns in estimating multinomial logit models lies in satisfying the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption. Theoretically, this assumption is, a priori, 
problematic, since it would mean, for instance, that an additional bank in the pool of possible targets would 
not impact the choice to acquire a bank. Yet the literature on bank M&A does not seem concerned with 
this problem when estimating multinomial logit models and empirical tests are rare. This is a worrisome 
fact that the current paper highlights and that future studies should consider more in depth, as not satisfying 
IIA can make estimators to become invalid. 
For the current sample, the results of the McFadden-Train-Tye test indeed reject IIA, as shown in 
Appendix D.1. Although Cheng and Long (2007) criticize the implementation of IIA tests, a possible 
solution would be to use a nested logit model and compare results with the simple multinomial model, but 
nesting acquirers/targets when they are so little in number within the sample is also seen to produce biased 
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estimates. To tackle this issue, this paper follows Koetter et al. (2005) and relaxes the IIA assumption. The 
model is hence always estimated using robust standard-errors to account for eventual distortions, 
abnormalities in error distribution and heteroscedasticity9. 
Recognizing possible modelling limitations, robustness checks focus on fit/predictive accuracy and 
on testing the model specification. In terms of prediction accuracy, the estimated model predicts 173 
acquirers (vs. 175) and 162 targets (vs. 157) throughout the period studied. The final model significantly 
improves on more simple specifications – the pseudo-R2 does not imply a measure of fit, as stated by 
McFadden (1973), but instead compares a given model to the null model.  
All explanatory variable inclusions are seen to be significant, as seen in Appendix D.2, where 
several specifications are tried out. The signs and significance of variables across specifications remain 
constant, with the exception of two determinants. Variable significance10 only changes for profitability, 
which only becomes relevant once market profitability is included. The same occurs with liquidity, which 
is relevant in determining the likelihood for targets only when market liquidity is not included. Yet, 
comparing coefficients for a multinomial model under different specifications might not be enough since 
unobserved heterogeneity may vary across models, as argued by Mood (2010), so coefficients for different 
subperiods/subsamples should be compared, which is a robustness check according to Buis (2017). 
High vs. low NPLs. The sample is divided in two groups, one including banks in countries with 
high levels of NPLs11 and another group for banks in all other EA countries, which are considered to have 
low NPLs. As seen in Appendices D.3.i and D.3.ii, with only one third of sample banks, high NPL countries 
account for 65% of acquirers and 55% of targets, showing relatively high M&A activity.  
                                                          
9 One could estimate the heteroscedastic multinomial model of Bhat (1995), yet this would require again IIA. 
10 The inclusion of dummies for NPL regulation instead of the categorical variable in the estimation of the base model was overall 
irrelevant. As seen ahead, this variable is not consistently significant. 
11 Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain, above the 4.9% EA average (2016) and as identified in ECB (2017a). 
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Results in Appendix D.3.v show performance is fundamentally relevant in determining M&A for 
banks in high NPL countries, while not being so in low NPL countries. Increases in individual NPLs imply 
a higher probability of becoming a target across the EA and M&A activity seems to have been stirred by 
less favorable economic conditions. This is especially true for low NPL countries, validating the hypothesis 
of M&A being driven by financial distress for the EA. Nonetheless, acquisitions by banks in low NPL 
counties appear to be much more sensible to systemic increases in NPLs and to market liquidity12.  
Acquisitions for banks in high NPL countries are also reduced by overall increases in NPLs but at 
a smaller extent compared to the other group of banks, being more sensible to shifts in market concentration. 
NPL regulation and the SSM dummy cease to be relevant, however, for both groups of countries.  
It should be highlighted that this approach yielded overall similar results to splitting the sample 
between banks in more vs. less profitable countries, as well as splitting for banks above vs. below average 
individual profitability, cost efficiency and NPL ratios. For the sake of brevity and given the interest of 
studying loan quality in detail, results are only reported for this subsampling approach. 
Pre vs. post sovereign debt crisis. The period between 2010 and 2012 marks a time of troubles 
for the EA: Greece and Ireland are bailed-out (2010), followed by Portugal and a second bailout for Greece 
(2011) and in response, the ECB initiates the Quantitative Easing program (Dec 2011). In 2012, when 
Mario Draghi announces that the ECB will do “whatever it takes” to save the EA, an inflexion point in 
NPLs is observed. 2011 marks a pivotal point in the middle point of the period under study and, as such, 
banks are split in two subsamples for 2005-2011 and 2012-2016 to check if the impacts of determinants on 
M&A changed across years. From summary statistics in Appendix D.4.i and D.4.ii, it is possible to see a 
                                                          
12 1 p.p. increase in market credit risk in a given year reduces the likelihood of a bank becoming an acquirer that year by 6% and 
58% for banks in high and low NPL countries respectively; moreover, it impacts negatively the likelihood of becoming a target by 
22% for the latter group. Higher liquidity promotes M&A for both acquirers and targets alike in banks in countries with low NPLs. 
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deterioration of macroeconomic conditions and profitability, for instance, which might be affecting the 
results of the base estimation. 
However, overall results, as found in Appendix D.4.iii, are in consonance with the base estimation. 
M&A activity during the crisis is driven by pro-cyclicality for both subperiods. The impacts of market 
credit risk and profitability are considerably larger for the 2005-2011 period compared to the overall 
results13. Target likelihood determinants exhibit similar impacts although some determinants (e.g.: 
capitalization) are no longer significant. For the 2012-2016 subperiod, idiosyncratic credit risk increases for 
banks are seen to be deterring investment, in parallel to widespread ones, for which the effect on the decision 
to acquire is substantially smaller. While market concentration seems to lose relevance in determining 
M&A after 2011, the positive of overall market liquidity on the likelihood of becoming a target is 
substantially significant both before and after the sovereign debt crisis. Finally, yet again, NPL regulation 
seems to be insignificant across groups.  
Appendix D.5 summarizes the outputs for all robustness estimations in relative risk ratio terms, for 
a better perception and comparison of the impact of each variable across specifications. 
6. Conclusion 
This study gives evidence of the importance of the business cycle and market conditions in driving 
acquisitions in the banking sector during the crisis years. Results are consistent with previous studies, 
although some determinants in the literature seem to lose relevance during the crisis period. Overall market 
conditions, such as profitability and liquidity, as well as uncertainty on asset quality at a systemic level seem 
to have played a fundamental role in effectively dissuading potential acquirers from investing, especially 
for banks in better-off countries. After drastically plummeting in comparison to pre-crisis years and 
                                                          
13 1 p.p. increase in the market NPL ratio in a given year reduces the likelihood of a bank becoming an acquirer that year by 20%, 
5 times the impact for the base model. 
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withdrawing within country borders, M&A activity was most intense in countries facing unfavorable 
economic conditions, driven by performance and with NPLs increasing banks’ chances to be in distress – 
and become targets.  
Findings on previous efforts at country level to improve asset quality are inconclusive, raising two 
questions: i) whether these regulations had an impact at all on NPLs and ii) if future actions on NPLs will 
indeed have the desired effect on M&A. If effective in reducing NPLs at a systemic level, these may 
promote M&A; yet the cost of stringency, as seen with the creation of the SSM, may be high. Supervisors 
and regulators must carefully consider the trade-off between tackling NPLs and adding pressure on banks 
to cope with their demands. 
Results appear to be robust under different specifications and subsamples. Some limitations are 
identified regarding both data and methodology. Employing more sophisticated techniques should improve 
on the current model, yet, as a starting point to analyze the period in question, the simplicity of using a 
multinomial logit model is favored. Added value would come from having more and better data on NPLs 
and M&A deals, as well as on relevant regulatory/supervisory actions during the crisis period. Further 
improvements could be undertaken by applying mixed multinomial logit models, which are challenging to 
implement for panel data, and by discerning between distressed vs. non-distressed deals and cross-border 
vs. domestic deals, to grasp the dynamics of the crisis and better capture the drivers of cross-border M&A. 
While not being attempting to be prescriptive, the current study intended to better understand the 
drivers of M&A in the past years in the perspective of withdrawing some policy implications. Rather than 
on suppositions, these should be based on facts, such as simple ones which are find in this paper: although 
distress can be a source of M&A, too much uncertainty on asset quality (NPLs) inhibits investment; banks’ 
investment decisions are mostly driven by the desire to maximize profit (especially in times of crisis) and 
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Appendix B – Description of independent variables 
Type of 
Variable 





𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 = ln(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) 
Total Assets: the amount of all gross 
investments, cash and equivalents, receivables, 
and other assets as they are presented on the 






𝑃𝑟𝑒 − 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Pre-tax profit: the balance left after deducting 
operating expenses, interest charges, and 
dividends on the preference shares, used 
interchangeably with net income, before taking 










Operating expenses: costs associated to the 
bank’s operations undertaken during a given 




















Equity: difference between total assets and total 
liabilities, which corresponds to the sum of all 
financial obligations of including all creditor 













Cash and cash convertibles: assets that are cash 
or can be converted into cash immediately under 



















Total loans: total loans to customers, reduced by 
possible default losses and unearned interest 
income at the end of fiscal year t. Total deposits: 
total customer and bank deposits in an institution 







𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Following the ECB definition: a bank loan is 
considered non-performing when more than 90 
days pass without the borrower paying the agreed 







Real growth rate of the domestic growth product 
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Dummy taking the value of 1 after 2014, year of 
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Average return on assets for the banking sector 








Average cash and cash equivalents to total assets 


















Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for the banking 
























Appendix C.1 – Total number and value of bank acquisitions in the EA  
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total % 
Austria 3 3 2 5 2 3 3 2 2 8 5 9 47 9% 
63 15,236 1,625 N/A N/A N/A 505 N/A 66 200 N/A 915 18,609 7% 
Belgium 2 0 0 2 0 3 3 1 1 3 0 1 16 3% 
N/A 0 0 10,360 0 N/A 4,751 22 N/A 606 0 1,170 16,909 6% 
Cyprus 0 2 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 2 9 2% 
0 12 0 75 N/A 0 62 0 0 0 N/A 30 178 0% 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0% 
0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 7 0% 
Finland 1 1 0 2 3 5 7 0 6 0 0 0 25 5% 
324 4,023 0 N/A 37 N/A N/A 0 33 0 0 0 4,418 2% 
France 4 9 7 4 3 5 0 0 1 1 0 3 37 7% 
N/A 542 643 2,382 N/A 1,022 0 0 N/A N/A 0 255 4,844 2% 
Germany 9 9 8 10 11 5 10 7 5 10 14 17 115 21% 
21,734 1,127 4,949 9,999 32 130 1,318 791 N/A 354 350 N/A 40,785 15% 
Greece 0 5 1 0 0 1 3 2 6 0 0 1 19 4% 
  0 2,951 N/A 0 0 N/A N/A 321 1,129 0 0 12 4,413 2% 
Ireland 0 0 2 1 0 1 2 1 2 2 1 0 12 2% 
  0 0 5,681 251 0 N/A N/A 1,300 60 2 N/A 0 7,294 3% 
Italy 8 9 8 10 6 13 6 3 4 8 9 13 97 18% 
  1,670 43,553 26,749 202 336 1,006 91 209 0 39 2,150 382 76,387 28% 
Latvia 1 4 0 2 0 1 4 0 2 1 0 0 15 3% 
  23 76 0 N/A 0 N/A 35 0 N/A 75 0 0 209 0% 
Lithuania 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 4 1% 
  0 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 0 0 6 0 6 0% 
Luxembourg 1 1 0 0 4 3 2 1 0 0 3 0 15 3% 
  N/A N/A 0 0 1,321 N/A 1,052 730 0 0 100 0 3,202 1% 
Malta 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 1 7 1% 
  0 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 35 109 N/A 145 0% 
          
            (Continued) 
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 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total % 
Netherlands 1 4 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 13 2% 
  N/A 1,108 69,898 12,800 N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 0 69 83,875 31% 
Portugal 2 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 8 1% 
  110 0 N/A 0 0 336 40 N/A 0 400 N/A 0 886 0% 
Slovakia 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 6 1% 
  0 N/A N/A 350 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 350 0% 
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 3 3 9 2% 
  0 0 0 0 N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 0 250 N/A 250 0% 
Spain 3 2 2 1 12 17 22 7 8 9 3 1 87 16% 
  23 762 N/A N/A N/A 1,044 1,363 2,306 1,157 2,578 N/A 3 9,235 3% 
Total 35 50 35 41 45 59 69 28 38 45 45 52 542 100% 
  23,947 69,392 109,545 36,419 1,726 3,537 9,223 5,679 2,444 4,288 2,965 2,835 272,001 100% 
Source: SNL 
 










































2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Total M&A Value (bln €) Total number of transactions NPL ratio average (%)
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Appendix C.3 – Banks in sample by country, involvement in M&A and year 
    2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total 
Austria Acquirers 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
 Targets 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 7 
 Non-involved 33 35 35 34 34 35 35 33 34 35 35 33 411 
Belgium Acquirers 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
 Targets 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 6 
 Non-involved 11 11 12 10 10 12 10 12 11 12 11 12 134 
Cyprus Acquirers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Targets 0 0 3 1 0 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 9 
 Non-involved 9 9 6 8 9 7 8 8 9 9 8 9 99 
Estonia Acquirers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Targets 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
 Non-involved 5 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 93 
Finland Acquirers 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 3 
 Targets 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 4 
 Non-involved 70 70 69 70 70 70 67 70 70 67 70 70 833 
France Acquirers 0 2 1 4 3 5 0 2 2 1 1 3 24 
 Targets 0 0 0 1 3 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 10 
 Non-involved 121 119 120 116 115 115 120 117 117 120 120 118 1418 
Germany Acquirers 1 3 3 2 6 3 1 2 0 0 3 2 26 
 Targets 2 4 1 6 3 3 2 1 0 2 1 4 29 
 Non-involved 762 758 761 757 756 759 762 762 765 763 761 759 9125 
Greece Acquirers 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 1 1 0 8 
 Targets 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 4 
 Non-involved 8 9 9 9 9 9 8 8 4 8 7 8 96 
Ireland Acquirers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Targets 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 7 
 Non-involved 14 13 13 14 14 14 12 14 14 13 12 14 161 
Italy Acquirers 3 6 5 19 7 4 6 1 3 3 8 7 72 
 Targets 1 2 8 3 2 1 5 3 2 4 4 8 43 
10 
 
 Non-involved 405 401 396 387 400 404 398 405 404 402 397 394 4793 
Lithuania Acquirers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Targets 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Non-involved 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 24 
Latvia Acquirers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Targets 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Non-involved 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Luxembourg Acquirers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Targets 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 4 
 Non-involved 16 16 16 15 15 16 16 14 16 16 16 16 188 
Malta Acquirers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
 Targets 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 
 Non-involved 12 12 12 11 12 12 12 12 12 11 11 11 140 
Netherlands Acquirers 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 Targets 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 
 Non-involved 18 18 16 18 18 17 18 18 18 18 18 17 212 
Portugal Acquirers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Targets 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 5 
 Non-involved 19 20 20 20 19 20 19 19 20 20 20 19 235 
Slovenia Acquirers 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
 Targets 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 5 
 Non-involved 7 7 5 7 5 7 5 7 6 7 6 7 76 
Slovakia Acquirers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Targets 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 Non-involved 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 83 
Spain Acquirers 0 2 1 2 2 3 3 7 5 3 2 1 31 
 Targets 0 1 2 1 0 2 1 0 1 2 1 3 14 
 Non-involved 54 51 51 51 52 49 50 47 48 49 51 50 603 
Total Acquirers 7 14 11 27 21 15 12 13 14 11 16 14 175 
 Targets 8 8 19 17 12 10 20 12 9 10 12 20 157 




Appendix C.4 – Regulatory actions on NPLs by country and year 










FMA-Minimum Standards for the Risk Management and Granting of Foreign 




Credit Institution Risk Management Regulation  
2015 Regulation 
Recovery plans and 
credit risk recognition 
FMA Regulation: Bank Recovery Plan Regulation  
2016 Law 
Contract design and 
processing 
Austrian Federal Mortgage and Real Estate Loan Act  
Belgium 2012 Regulation Broad reform 
Regulation of the NBB on Collateral Valuation and Legal regime for Covered Bonds 
and Banking Act on the legal status and supervision of credit institutions 
Cyprus 
2008 Law 
Management of credit 
risk 
Guidelines to banks on the management of credit risk  
2013 Directive Broad reform 
Directives on loan origination and review of existing loans, loan impairment and 
provisioning procedures and arrears management 





Regulation on Credit institution credit granting, and write-down of receivables 












Regulation on Limits on granting housing loans and maximum loan maturity 




   (Continued) 
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Country Date Type Topic Summary 
Finland 
2014 Regulation Broad reform General Banking Act of Finland  
2016 Guidelines 
Financial recognition 
and collateral valuation 





Minimum Requirements for Risk Management 
2006 Regulation Collateral valuation 





Solvency regulation (Solvabilitätsverordnung) 
2014 Regulation 
Reporting and financial 
recognition 
Reporting reform (FinaRisikoV) and details on risk-bearing capacity 
Greece 
2014 Regulation Management of NPLs 
Executive Committee Act (ECA) on loan management, governance, resolution, NPL 
monitoring and reporting framework 
2015 Regulation Management of NPLs Changes to the ECA on reporting and forbearance 










Valuation Processes in the Banking Crisis and Impairment Provisioning and 
Disclosure Guidelines 
2013 Framework  Mortgage arrears 
Mortgage Arrears Resolution Targets framework on workout strategies and Internal 
Guidelines 
2015 Regulation Mortgage lending Restrictions on Residential Mortgage Lending 
    (Continued) 
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Country Date Type Topic Summary 
Italy 
2005 Circular 
Reporting and financial 
recognition 




Provisions for the assessment of credit risk management processes (supervisory 













FCMC Regulations on Credit Risk Management and on the Preparation and 
Submission of Information on Loan Portfolio Structure of Banks 
2013 Regulation 
Reporting and financial 
recognition 





Minimum loan assessment requirements on identification of impaired loans and loan 
loss provisioning 
2008 Regulation 
Management of risk 
assessment and internal 
controls 








and risk management 
Risk Management regulation to improve transparency and consistency 
2014 Circular 
Reporting and financial 
recognition 













Amendment to the 2013 rule 
    (Continued) 
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Country Date Type Topic Summary 
Netherlands 
2006 Law 
Reporting and financial 
recognition 















Minimum requirements on credit risk management and control 








Criteria for problem loans identification and recording. Procedures and guidance on 
collateral and provisioning. Reporting requirements on asset quality and credit risk 
management. 






Regulation on risk management, requirements and ICAAP implementation; 
regulation on assessment of credit risk losses, impairment, reporting and financial 
recognition 
2014 Guidelines NPL management Guidelines on impairment and provisioning for restructured clients 
2015 Guidelines NPL management 
Guidelines on customer monitoring, early warning systems for increased credit risk 
and management of doubtful claims 
Spain 2005 Circular 
Credit risk 
management 
Requirements on credit risk analysis, allowances and provision; criteria for 




Appendix C.5 – Summary statistics by category of bank in sample 
Appendix C.5.i – Number of banks by category and year 
 
 Acquirers Targets Non-involved 
  Mean StDev Mean StDev Mean StDev 
Log (Total Assets) 18.103 2.022 17.352 1.989 14.392 2.277 
Return on Assets 0.002 0.024 0.000 0.020 0.006 0.051 
Operating Expenses to Total Assets 0.017 0.007 0.016 0.010 0.026 0.112 
Asset growth 0.130 0.222 0.002 0.157 0.047 0.201 
Equity to Total Assets 0.070 0.076 0.060 0.036 0.091 0.252 
Liquid Assets to Total Assets 0.101 0.076 0.128 0.101 0.146 0.162 
Loans to Deposits 1.365 1.022 4.714 22.88 18.97 988.83 
NPL to Total Assets 0.057 0.059 0.082 0.107 0.053 1.010 
GDP growth 0.012 0.030 0.030 0.051 0.024 0.029 
Unemployment rate 0.113 0.065 0.094 0.049 0.082 0.033 
# Regulatory actions on NPLs 1.533 0.442 1.555 0.459 2.040 0.462 
HHI 0.061 0.058 0.078 0.079 0.052 0.064 
 










Log (Total Assets) 3.479 24.623 18.963 
Return on Assets 0.880 -2.157 -3.685 
Operating Expenses to Total Assets 0.130 -9.680 -8.134 
Asset growth 6.245 4.999 -3.693 
Equity to Total Assets 1.516 -3.619 -9.298 
Liquid Assets to Total Assets -2.749 -7.660 -2.179 
Loans to Deposits -1.873 -2.536 -1.989 
NPL to Total Assets -2.699 0.436 2.657 
GDP growth -3.990 -5.361 1.541 
Unemployment rate 3.041 6.478 3.262 
# Regulatory actions on NPLs -0.451 -15.420 -13.49 
HHI -2.261 2.082 4.204 
Note: Significant differences at 95% level in bold 
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Appendix C.6 – Correlation matrix 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Size 1 1.00                
Profitability  2 -0.02 1.00               
Cost efficiency  3 -0.18 -0.09 1.00              
Asset growth 4 -0.05 -0.11 0.13 1.00             
Capitalization 5 -0.13 -0.26 0.04 -0.03 1.00            
Liquidity 6 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.04 1.00           
Loan specialization 7 0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 1.00          
NPL 8 -0.01 -0.10 -0.02 -0.07 0.02 -0.19 -0.01 1.00         
GDP growth 9 -0.06 0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.05 -0.01 -0.23 1.00        
Unemployment rate 10 0.11 -0.06 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.37 -0.30 1.00       
SSM 11 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.05 1.00      
NPL regulation 12 -0.09 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.07 0.04 -0.06 0.03 1.00     
Market profitability 13 0.09 0.30 -0.08 -0.06 0.03 0.13 0.01 -0.17 0.19 -0.19 0.03 -0.01 1.00    
Market liquidity 14 0.31 0.11 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.37 0.02 -0.11 0.15 0.04 -0.11 -0.05 0.36 1.00   
Market credit risk 15 -0.07 -0.05 0.03 0.09 0.03 -0.06 -0.01 0.47 -0.42 0.42 -0.06 -0.05 -0.17 -0.16 1.00  
HHI 16 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.06 0.11 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.07 -0.06 1.00 











Appendix D.1 – Mc-Fadden-Train-Tye test specification and results 
Appendix D.1.i – Test description 
 
The Mc-Fadden-Train-Tye likelihood ratio test compares the log-likelihood of the full 
(base) model to that of restricted estimations, where outcomes are dropped. Applying the notation 
in McFadden (1977) and Cheng and Long (2007), which we follow in detail, to the model 
employed in this study, the full model is given, as in section 3, by: 





 , 𝑖 = 0, 1                                              (3) 
While the restricted models 𝑗 = 1, 2, 3 for different restrictions of 𝑖 are given by: 





 , 𝑖 = 0, 1                                          (4) 





 , 𝑖 = 0, 2                                          (5) 





 , 𝑖 = 1, 2                                          (6) 
 Under IIA, 𝛽𝑖
𝑟?̂?  for 𝑗 = 1, 2, 3 are consistent yet inefficient, while the estimated 𝛽𝑖
?̂?
 in the 
full (base) model are consistent as well as efficient. Under 𝐻0, both models are  The Mc-Fadden-
Train-Tye test is thus given, for each restricted model 𝑗, by: 𝑀𝑇𝑇 =  −2 [𝐿𝑟 (𝛽𝑖
?̂?
) − 𝐿𝑟 (𝛽𝑖
𝑟?̂?)], 
where 𝐿𝑟 is the log-likelihood for each estimation. If IIA holds, MTT ~ 𝜒
2(𝑡) where 𝑡 corresponds 
to the degrees of freedom of each restricted model (which is not the case). 
 








𝑗 = 1 -1150.3784 -195.91*** 
𝑗 = 2 -1192.0991 -279.35*** 
𝑗 = 3 -1115.0705 -125.29*** 




Appendix D.2 – Alternative specifications for the multinomial logit model  
 
Base regression (1) (2) 
 
Acquirers Targets Acquirers Targets Acquirers Targets 
Size 
0.345*** 0.348*** 0.375*** 0.342*** 0.363*** 0.334*** 
[0.06] [0.055] [0.059] [0.055] [0.058] [0.055] 
Profitability  
22.356** -2.611 9.619* 8.36 3.744 5.987 
[10.934] [6.473] [5.636] [5.183] [5.993] [5.059] 
Cost efficiency  
3.377 3.146* 2.959 1.490 3.002 1.938 
[2.489] [1.866] [2.33] [5.356] [2.100] [4.548] 
Asset growth 
0.428 -0.805 0.533 -1.065 0.516 -1.148 
[0.364] [0.757] [0.345] [0.826] [0.349] [0.813] 
Capitalization 
-10.57*** -5.901** -7.056*** -8.51*** -5.536** -7.77*** 
[3.087] [2.365] [2.589] [2.29] [2.526] [2.247] 
Liquidity 
-1.957* -0.848 -2.366** -2.459** -1.970* -2.16** 
[1.154] [1.006] [1.165] [1.128] [1.108] [1.095] 
Loan specialization 
-0.002** 0.000 -0.001** 0.000 -0.001* 0.000 
[0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
NPL 
-1.043 3.397** 0.507 4.105*** 0.530 3.513** 
[2.434] [1.458] [1.524] [1.506] [1.415] [1.452] 
GDP growth 
-3.539 2.587   -3.739 2.324 
[5.121] [3.220]   [4.514] [3.300] 
Unemployment rate 
14.13*** 6.126**   9.173*** 7.029*** 
[2.646] [2.534]   [2.349] [2.200] 
SSM 
-0.615** -0.473**     
[0.243] [0.223]     
NPL regulation 
-0.130* 0.014     
[0.074] [0.072]     
Market profitability 
26.000* -3.312     
[14.201] [8.058]     
Market liquidity 
-0.261 4.713***     
[2.405] [1.778]     
Market credit risk 
-4.588** 1.971     
[2.353] [1.765]     
HHI 
-4.585* 3.198**     
[2.577] [1.497]     
Constant 
-6.29*** -6.99*** -6.16*** -5.72*** -6.64*** -6.29*** 
[0.542] [0.465] [0.277] [0.25] [0.379] [0.335] 
McFadden R2 9.7% 5.9% 7.1% 
χ2 227.02 (34) *** 138.71 (18) *** 166.53 (22) *** 
Number of obs. 9872 9919 9919 








Acquirers Targets Acquirers Targets 
Size 
0.359*** 0.336*** 0.35*** 0.346*** 
[0.058] [0.054] [0.06] [0.055] 
Profitability  
3.925 6.166 21.945** -3.358 
[5.777] [4.917] [10.781] [6.522] 
Cost efficiency  
3.034 2.107 3.4 3.133* 
[2.007] [4.103] [2.559] [1.87] 
Asset growth 
0.496 -1.028 0.42 -0.894 
[0.335] [0.79] [0.382] [0.773] 
Capitalization 
-5.586** -7.70*** -10.53*** -5.789** 
[2.489] [2.216] [3.06] [2.355] 
Liquidity 
-1.719 -2.051* -2.043* -0.832 
[1.107] [1.086] [1.129] [0.998] 
Loan specialization 
-0.002** 0.000 -0.001* 0.000 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 
NPL 
1.044 3.919*** -1.954 2.93** 
[1.411] [1.441] [2.461] [1.47] 
GDP growth 
0.9 4.424 -8.486* 0.931 
[4.357] [3.227] [5.029] [3.236] 
Unemployment rate 
11.013*** 8.085*** 12.729*** 5.258** 
[2.391] [2.208] [2.612] [2.543] 
SSM 
-0.732*** -0.58***   
[0.237] [0.219]   
NPL regulation 
-0.116* 0.004   
[0.07] [0.071]   
Market profitability 
  23.575* -4.365 
  [13.731] [7.998] 
Market liquidity 
  0.739 5.211*** 
  [2.326] [1.739] 
Market credit risk 
  -5.443** 1.723 
  [2.559] [1.799] 
HHI 
  -4.625* 3.371** 
  [2.605] [1.512] 
Constant 
-6.37*** -6.16*** -6.68*** -7.12*** 
[0.396] [0.369] [0.522] [0.43] 
McFadden R2 8.0% 8.3% 
χ2 185.94 (26) *** 193.57 (30) *** 
Number of obs. 9919 9872 
Robust st. dev. in brackets. *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level,  





Appendix D.3 – M&A in high vs. low NPL countries 
 
Appendix D.3.i – Number of banks by category and type of country by year 
 




Acquirers 4 8 6 21 11 7 9 9 12 7 12 8 114 
Targets 2 4 16 5 3 5 13 5 5 7 9 13 87 




Acquirers 3 6 5 6 10 8 3 4 2 4 4 6 61 
Targets 6 4 3 12 9 5 7 7 4 3 3 7 70 
Non-involved 1,057 1,056 1,058 1,048 1,047 1,053 1,056 1,055 1,060 1,059 1,059 1,053 12,661 
 
 






Appendix D.3.iii – Summary statistics by category of bank in sample for High NPL countries 
 
 Acquirers Targets Non-involved 
  Mean StDev Mean StDev Mean StDev 
Log (Total Assets) 17.58 1.817 16.96 1.820 14.29 2.194 
Return on Assets 0.001 0.029 -0.002 0.026 0.004 0.046 
Operating Expenses to Total Assets 0.019 0.006 0.019 0.010 0.029 0.174 
Asset growth 0.127 0.174 0.032 0.169 0.055 0.195 
Equity to Total Assets 0.084 0.089 0.069 0.033 0.101 0.092 
Liquid Assets to Total Assets 0.076 0.054 0.109 0.114 0.129 0.152 
Loans to Deposits 1.298 0.336 2.405 6.327 9.013 81.98 
NPL to Total Assets 0.078 0.063 0.117 0.125 0.115 1.756 
GDP growth 0.007 0.029 0.030 0.060 0.015 0.031 
Unemployment rate 0.130 0.073 0.112 0.057 0.102 0.041 
# Regulatory actions on NPLs 1.733 0.448 1.750 0.485 2.014 0.461 
HHI 0.056 0.044 0.069 0.044 0.046 0.027 
 
Appendix D.3.iv – Summary statistics by category of bank in sample for Low NPL countries 
 
 Acquirers Targets Non-involved 
  Mean StDev Mean StDev Mean StDev 
Log (Total Assets) 19.10 2.034 17.78 2.088 14.44 2.312 
Return on Assets 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.009 0.007 0.054 
Operating Expenses to Total Assets 0.013 0.006 0.014 0.010 0.024 0.067 
Asset growth 0.134 0.294 -0.029 0.137 0.044 0.204 
Equity to Total Assets 0.042 0.019 0.051 0.036 0.087 0.298 
Liquid Assets to Total Assets 0.152 0.089 0.150 0.081 0.153 0.165 
Loans to Deposits 1.492 1.677 7.279 32.51 23.69 1199.2 
NPL to Total Assets 0.016 0.011 0.040 0.056 0.023 0.040 
GDP growth 0.023 0.030 0.031 0.039 0.029 0.027 
Unemployment rate 0.080 0.019 0.072 0.022 0.072 0.022 
# Regulatory actions on NPLs 1.145 0.432 1.306 0.409 2.053 0.462 
HHI 0.070 0.078 0.089 0.107 0.055 0.075 
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Appendix D.3.v – Multinomial logit model results for high vs. low NPL countries 
 
 
High NPL countries Low NPL countries 
 
Acquirers Targets Acquirers Targets 
Size 
0.356*** 0.328*** 0.478*** 0.364*** 
[0.075] [0.074] [0.096] [0.079] 
Profitability  
28.853** -0.412 23.123** -25.69 
[13.418] [8.748] [11.680] [16.705] 
Cost efficiency  
12.169* 19.274*** 3.672 2.410 
[6.490] [6.455] [3.19] [3.783] 
Asset growth 
0.663 -0.457 -0.147 -0.635 
[0.408] [1.006] [0.933] [1.021] 
Capitalization 
-13.645** -9.651** -16.229*** -8.054** 
[5.915] [4.748] [5.086] [3.698] 
Liquidity 
-4.835*** -1.376 1.243 -0.483 
[1.367] [1.539] [1.508] [1.506] 
Loan specialization 
-0.001* 0.000 -0.001* 0.000 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 
NPL 
-0.848 2.457* -12.19 5.954* 
[2.036] [1.445] [14.939] [3.656] 
GDP growth 
-0.860 -0.743 -7.892 11.930 
[4.187] [3.768] [8.739] [7.401] 
Unemployment rate 
6.447** -0.135 46.433*** 23.368*** 
[2.996] [3.366] [9.928] [8.703] 
SSM 
-0.548* -0.223 -0.457 -0.392 
[0.338] [0.309] [0.447] [0.34] 
NPL regulation 
-0.056 0.099 -0.055 -0.079 
[0.078] [0.099] [0.127] [0.105] 
Market profitability 
5.160** 14.529 29.761** -79.204*** 
[2.593] [17.519] [12.633] [21.475] 
Market liquidity 
4.869 0.744 6.450* 8.679*** 
[3.906] [3.081] [3.771] [2.519] 
Market credit risk 
-6.635** 0.356 -86.57*** -25.472* 
[2.785] [1.990] [33.317] [13.125] 
HHI 
-19.797* 11.036*** -7.657** 1.389 
[11.480] [4.079] [3.570] [2.13] 
Constant 
-4.189*** -5.74*** -7.852*** -8.028*** 
[0.495] [0.617] [1.192] [0.800] 
McFadden R2 18.6% 21.9% 
χ2 254.35 (32) *** 242.93 (32) *** 
Number of obs. 3325 6539 
Robust st. dev. in brackets. *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level 
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Appendix D.4 – M&A pre and post-sovereign debt crisis 
 
Appendix D.4.i – Summary statistics by category of bank in sample pre-sovereign crisis 
 
 Acquirers Targets Non-involved 
  Mean StDev Mean StDev Mean StDev 
Log (Total Assets) 18.629 1.682 17.716 1.977 15.283 2.461 
Return on Assets 0.006 0.011 0.006 0.010 0.006 0.052 
Operating Expenses to Total Assets 0.017 0.007 0.014 0.010 0.021 0.050 
Asset growth 0.126 0.241 0.039 0.210 0.072 0.179 
Equity to Total Assets 0.061 0.035 0.055 0.040 0.081 0.143 
Liquid Assets to Total Assets 0.116 0.076 0.143 0.091 0.159 0.160 
Loans to Deposits 1.469 0.849 8.778 34.453 9.312 155.54 
NPL to Total Assets 0.037 0.036 0.054 0.073 0.037 0.057 
GDP growth 0.016 0.032 0.036 0.044 0.024 0.035 
Unemployment rate 0.083 0.029 0.074 0.028 0.082 0.020 
# Regulatory actions on NPLs 1.274 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.336 0.000 
HHI 0.046 0.038 0.075 0.086 0.049 0.065 
 
Appendix D.4.ii – Summary statistics by category of bank in sample post-sovereign crisis 
 
 Acquirers Targets Non-involved 
  Mean StDev Mean StDev Mean StDev 
Log (Total Assets) 17.624 2.191 17.082 1.981 14.074 2.117 
Return on Assets -0.002 0.031 -0.004 0.024 0.006 0.052 
Operating Expenses to Total Assets 0.016 0.006 0.018 0.010 0.027 0.126 
Asset growth 0.135 0.209 -0.021 0.098 0.043 0.199 
Equity to Total Assets 0.077 0.100 0.064 0.032 0.093 0.280 
Liquid Assets to Total Assets 0.088 0.075 0.118 0.108 0.141 0.160 
Loans to Deposits 1.280 1.168 1.674 3.627 20.407 1124.86 
NPL to Total Assets 0.075 0.070 0.101 0.122 0.057 1.139 
GDP growth 0.008 0.028 0.026 0.057 0.024 0.022 
Unemployment rate 0.148 0.077 0.112 0.056 0.081 0.042 
# Regulatory actions on NPLs 1.663 0.503 1.831 0.503 2.412 0.500 








Appendix D.4.iii – Multinomial logit model results for pre vs. post-sovereign debt crisis 
 
 
Pre-sovereign debt crisis Post-sovereign debt crisis 
 
Acquirers Targets Acquirers Targets 
Size 
0.340*** 0.322*** 0.553*** 0.443*** 
[0.080] [0.073] [0.079] [0.074] 
Profitability  
32.693** -6.099 36.500*** -3.035 
[15.657] [11.893] [13.636] [8.862] 
Cost efficiency  
3.604 2.371 -9.285 4.828** 
[5.325] [4.927] [15.481] [2.454] 
Asset growth 
0.172 -0.152 0.710 -2.785** 
[0.717] [0.778] [0.543] [1.299] 
Capitalization 
-8.712* -1.318 -8.69** -12.07*** 
[4.648] [2.978] [4.373] [3.735] 
Liquidity 
-0.562 -1.093 -3.948** -0.806 
[1.426] [1.357] [1.912] [1.289] 
Loan specialization 
-0.003 0.000 -0.002** 0.000 
[0.006] [0.002] [0.001] [0.000] 
NPL 
9.261 4.466* -3.226** 2.077 
[3.808] [2.454] [1.633] [1.956] 
GDP growth 
-11.902* -6.287 -23.745* 0.009 
[6.127] [5.043] [12.938] [4.233] 
Unemployment rate 
12.55*** -0.906 13.38*** 11.02*** 
[4.696] [4.800] [3.378] [2.731] 
SSM 
n.a. n.a. -0.936** -0.770** 
n.a. n.a. [0.464] [0.348] 
NPL regulation 
-0.165 -0.022 -0.018 0.068 
[0.105] [0.097] [0.108] [0.104] 
Market profitability 
91.33*** -7.094 6.592** 5.224 
[22.889] [14.587] [3.263] [11.796] 
Market liquidity 
-5.797 6.831*** -2.212 2.470** 
[3.610] [2.307] [3.709] [1.244] 
Market credit risk 
-22.171*** -0.790 -2.817** 3.739* 
[7.234] [3.923] [1.401] [2.152] 
HHI 
-9.715** 5.322*** -4.370 -0.436 
[4.704] [1.766] [3.220] [2.548] 
Constant 
-4.699*** -5.879*** -4.699*** -5.879*** 
[0.823] [0.722] [0.823] [0.722] 
McFadden R2 15.5% 24.8% 
χ2 -211.76 (30) ***  -288.34 (30) *** 
Number of obs. 3963 5909 
Robust st. dev. in brackets. *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level 




Appendix D.5 – Relative risk ratios for all specifications 
 
Robust st. dev. in relative risk ratio form in brackets 
 
Base model High NPL Low NPL Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
Acq. Tar. Acq. Tar. Acq. Tar. Acq. Tar. Acq. Tar. 
Size 1.412 1.416 1.428 1.389 1.613 1.440 1.405 1.380 1.739 1.558 
[0.061] [0.057] [0.078] [0.077] [0.101] [0.083] [0.084] [0.076] [0.083] [0.077] 
Profitability 1.251 0.974 1.335 0.996 1.261 0.774 1.387 0.941 1.441 0.971 
[0.116] [0.067] [0.144] [0.092] [0.308] [0.182] [0.17] [0.127] [0.147] [0.093] 
Cost efficiency 1.034 1.032 1.130 1.213 1.038 1.025 1.037 1.024 0.912 1.050 
[0.025] [0.019] [0.068] [0.067] [0.033] [0.039] [0.055] [0.051] [0.168] [0.025] 
Asset growth 1.004 0.992 1.007 0.996 0.999 0.994 1.002 0.999 1.008 0.973 
[0.004] [0.008] [0.005] [0.011] [0.01] [0.011] [0.008] [0.008] [0.006] [0.014] 
Capitalization 0.900 0.943 0.873 0.909 0.851 0.923 0.917 0.987 0.917 0.887 
[0.031] [0.024] [0.061] [0.049] [0.053] [0.038] [0.048] [0.031] [0.045] [0.039] 
Liquidity 0.981 0.992 0.953 0.987 1.013 0.996 0.995 0.990 0.962 0.992 
[0.012] [0.010] [0.014] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.015] [0.014] [0.02] [0.013] 
Loan 
specialization 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 
NPL 0.990 1.035 0.992 1.025 0.886 1.062 1.098 1.046 0.969 1.021 
[0.025] [0.015] [0.021] [0.015] [0.162] [0.038] [0.039] [0.025] [0.017] [0.02] 
GDP growth 0.965 1.026 0.992 0.993 0.925 1.127 0.888 0.940 0.789 1.001 
[0.053] [0.033] [0.043] [0.039] [0.092] [0.077] [0.064] [0.052] [0.139] [0.044] 
Unemployment 
rate 
1.152 1.063 1.067 0.999 1.591 1.264 1.134 0.991 1.144 1.117 
[0.027] [0.026] [0.031] [0.035] [0.105] [0.091] [0.049] [0.05] [0.035] [0.028] 
SSM 0.541 0.623 0.579 0.801 0.634 0.676 n.a. n.a. 0.393 0.464 
[0.275] [0.250] [0.403] [0.363] [0.564] [0.405] n.a. n.a. [0.591] [0.417] 
NPL regulation 0.878 1.014 0.946 1.105 0.947 0.925 0.848 0.979 0.983 1.071 
[0.077] [0.074] [0.082] [0.105] [0.136] [0.111] [0.111] [0.102] [0.115] [0.11] 
Market 
profitability 
1.297 0.967 1.050 1.008 1.067 1.091 0.944 1.071 0.979 1.026 
[0.153] [0.084] [0.04] [0.032] [0.039] [0.026] [0.037] [0.024] [0.038] [0.027] 
Market 
liquidity 
0.997 1.048 0.936 1.004 0.421 0.776 0.802 0.993 0.973 1.039 
[0.024] [0.018] [0.029] [0.021] [0.396] [0.141] [0.076] [0.041] [0.015] [0.022] 
Market credit 
risk 
0.955 1.02 0.821 1.117 0.927 1.014 0.908 1.055 0.958 0.996 
[0.024] [0.018] [0.122] [0.042] [0.037] [0.022] [0.049] [0.018] [0.033] [0.026] 
HHI 0.955 1.032 1.053 1.157 1.347 0.453 2.493 0.932 1.069 1.054 
[0.026] [0.015] [0.231] [0.192] [0.411] [0.24] [0.258] [0.158] [0.17] [0.126] 
Constant 0.002 0.001 0.016 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.010 0.003 0.010 0.003 
[0.72] [0.59] [0.641] [0.854] [2.294] [1.226] [1.278] [1.059] [1.278] [1.059] 
